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Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment's
Role in Extradition Law and Practice
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the negotiations for the adoption of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court,' a small but determined group
of states, mainly from Arabic and Islamic countries and the
Commonwealth Caribbean, argued that the new institution should
impose capital punishment. Perhaps surprisingly, the United
States voiced opposition to capital punishment, even though many
of its internal jurisdictions support it. In a defining moment of the
negotiations, U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer took the floor at
the formal session of the Working Group on Penalties, and argued
that the International Court, if empowered to impose the death
penalty, would fail because a large number of states would simply
refuse to transfer criminals to the Court.2
The exclusion of a death penalty provision in the Rome
Statute reflects a growing consensus among states that capital
punishment is cruel, inhuman, degrading, and incompatible with
contemporary values and international human rights norms.3 In
* Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway;
Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights. The author wishes to thank William Galvin for
his assistance in researching this material.
1. The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. It established the
International Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. The maximum penalty available under the Rome Statute is life
imprisonment. For a general description of the Rome Statute and the Court, see
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(2001).
2. See William A. Schabas, Life, Death and the Crime of Crimes: Supreme Penalties
and the ICC Statute, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 263 (2000) (providing a report based on
personal observations at the session).
3. Mohamed v. President of S. Afr., 2001 (3) SALR 893, para. 40 (CC).
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recent years, developments in international extradition practices
reveal that capital punishment is incompatible with effective
international cooperation in criminal law matters. Indeed, this
also explains the exclusion of the death penalty from the statutes
of two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
which the Security Council established in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. At that time, three of the five permanent members,
the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, were
enthusiastic practitioners of capital punishment. Further, the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could not be considered
abolitionist at the time. Yet, capital punishment was simply out of
the question.4
Although there is no international law prohibiting capital
punishment, many international legal standards severely limit its
application. For example, Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) declares that the death
penalty may only be imposed after a rigorously fair trial and a
conviction for the most serious of crimes. Article 6 also does not
allow a death sentence to be imposed on pregnant women or for
5juvenile offenses. In addition, four international treaties go
further than Article 6 by completely prohibiting capital•6
punishment, and the American Convention on Human Rights
prohibits the death penalty in states where it has already been
4. The Security Council did not discuss the death penalty during adoption of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, many
of the proposals submitted by States expressed opposition to the death penalty. In the
case of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rwanda argued
strenuously for inclusion of the death penalty, and actually voted against adoption of the
Statute partly for this reason. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-50 (3d ed. 2002).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,174 [hereinafter ICCPR].
6. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for
signature Apr. 28, 1983, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 114; Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at abolition of the death
penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at art. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, approved June 8, 1990, art. 1. 29 I.L.M. 1447, 1448; Protocol No. 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning
the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, opened for signature May 3, 2002,
art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 187.
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abolished.7  Together, these treaties apply to approximately
seventy states. Moreover, the fourth Geneva Convention outlaws
the use of capital punishment on citizens of occupied territories if
their government had previously abolished the death penalty prior
to the occupation."
International law also promotes the abolition of the death
penalty indirectly. Many states that have abolished capital
punishment refuse to extradite individuals to states that still
impose the death penalty. Abolitionist states may also refuse to
participate in other forms of legal assistance that could facilitate
the imposition of capital punishment in a retentionist state.
Consequently, states retaining the death penalty are indirectly
pressured into reducing or eliminating it entirely.
In recent years, the practice of indirect abolition has also
entered the realm of international human rights law. International
human rights tribunals have ruled that extradition in capital cases
violates treaty norms that essentially prohibit cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment. In support of this movement,
Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union declares, "No one may be removed, expelled or extradited
to a state where there is a serious risk that he or she would be
subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." 9
Consequently, this Article discusses how the practice of
capital punishment significantly conflicts with international
extradition laws and norms. Part II provides background on how
extradition treaties have addressed capital punishment, including
the development of requiring requesting states' assurances that
they will not impose the death penalty. Part III discusses a pivotal
European Court of Human Rights extradition case, Soering v.
United Kingdom, where the Court found that extreme conditions
from a long waiting period on death row constituted inhuman and
degrading treatment, and violated Article 3 of the European
7. American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, adopted
Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 145.
8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68(2), 75 U.N.T.S. 285,330.
9. Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 19, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1: see also Council
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, preamble, para. 13, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1 (identical
text).
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Convention on Human Rights. Part III also examines Soering's
influence on subsequent international and domestic extradition
cases. Through a focus on Canadian and Australian cases, Part IV
describes how the United Nations Human Rights Committee
handles extradition cases involving capital punishment. Part V
explores approaches that national constitutional courts have taken
in death penalty extradition cases, through examples from Italy,
Canada, and South Africa. Part VI concludes with commentary on
the effects of abolitionist states' refusals to extradite to countries
where the death penalty may be imposed.
II. EXTRADITION TREATIES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The practice of extraditing individuals on the condition that
they not be subjected to the death penalty"' originated in the mid-
nineteenth century, when states began abolishing capital
punishment in their domestic legal systems. The 1872 extradition
treaty between Spain and Brazil provided that if the requesting
state did not guarantee that the suspect would not be subject to
capital punishment, then the state could deny extradition. A
similar provision appears in the 1873 treaty between Portugal and
Switzerland, and in the 1892 extradition treaty between Portugal
and England. The 1908 treaty between the United States and
Portugal was accompanied by an exchange of notes to the same
effect. Both the U.S. Senate resolution ratifying the treaty and
U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt's proclamations expressed
support for these provisions. The treaty between the United
States and Costa Rica, negotiated in the early 1920s, took a similar
approach.12
Several model multilateral extradition treaties also include
similar references to restrictions on extradition in cases where the
death penalty may be imposed. The first draft multilateral
10. Usually, the extradition treaties including this limitation would stipulate that the
death penalty be commuted to the next most serious punishment.
11. In the eighteenth century, states such as Tuscany were inspired by the writing of
Cesare Beccaria. The French revolutionaries unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate
capital punishment from the Code Pdnal adopted in 1791. The U.S. patriot, Thomas
Paine, who had moved to France to assist in that country's revolution, was an
uncompromising advocate of abolition. See Thomas Paine, Reasons for Preserving the Life
of Louis Capet, in THOMAS PAINE READER 394-98 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds.,
1987) (where Paine insisted that even the King's life should not be taken).




extradition treaty of this sort was adopted in Montevideo in 1889.
It served as a model for subsequent initiatives, such as the 1907
and 1923 extradition conventions of the Central American
republics, and the 1912 draft convention of the International
Commission of Jurists. More recently, Article 4 of the 1990 Model
Treaty on Extradition, proposed by the Eighth U.N. Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, states the
following:
Extradition may be refused in any of the following
circumstances... [i]f the offence for which extradition is
requested carries the death penalty under the law of the
requesting State, unless that State gives such assurance as the
requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will
not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out."
Article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition
declares that, when an offense is punishable by death under the
law of the requesting party, but the requested party has prohibited
(or does not normally practice) capital punishment, "extradition
may be refused unless the requesting Party gives such assurance as
the requested Party considers sufficient that the death penalty will
not be carried out.,'
14
The practice of including conditions such as these in
extradition treaties is now widespread. Even states that have not
abolished the death penalty often require that the provision be
contained in their bilateral instruments. For example, Article VI
of the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United
States entitles the sending state to insist upon sufficient guarantees
that the death penalty will not be imposed as a condition for
extradition. The parties included the provision pursuant to the
U.S. request.15 At the time, both the United States and Canada
had legislation allowing capital punishment. Although Canadian
courts had continued to sentence people to death,16 executions
were systematically commuted, and capital punishment would be
13. Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., Agenda Item
100, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991).
14. European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11,
359 U.N.T.S. 273, 282.
15. Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America, Dec. 3,
1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 3.
16. See also Miller v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, 684 (Can.) (affirming the
lawfulness of an execution for a crime and the defendants' death sentences).
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abolished within a few years of the treaty's adoption.17 Similarly,
at the time, many U.S. jurisdictions had death penalty statutes,
although the practice had been temporarily suspended while the
U.S. Supreme Court deliberated constitutional issues.18
III. EXTRADITION FROM EUROPE: THE SOERING CASE
As early as 1983, the European Commission on Human
Rights 9 held that a sending state would violate Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights0 if it extradites a suspect
to a country where torture might be threatened or inflicted.21 Only
a few years later, in Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, which involved
extradition from the United Kingdom to California,22  the
Commission considered the possibility that the death penalty,
although ostensibly permitted by Article 2(1) of the Convention,23
might raise issues under Article 3.24 Kirkwood's application was
declared inadmissible, however, because he had not demonstrated
17. See, e.g., Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 2). ch. 105 (1976) (Can.).
18. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discussing when a death penalty
statute is so discriminatory on its face that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment); cf
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that death penalty may stand where
sentencing procedures are not arbitrary and capricious, and juries are circumscribed by
legislative guidelines).
19. The European Commission on Human Rights was established by the European
Convention on Human Rights to examine petitions from individuals alleging that their
rights had been violated by their government. Under specific conditions, decisions of the
Commission could be reviewed and reconsidered by the European Court of Human
Rights, operating essentially as an appellate body. In 1998, amendments to the European
Convention on Human Rights entered into force, abolishing the Commission and litigants
to apply directly to the European Court of Human Rights.
20. Article 3 prohibits torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
21. Altun v. Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611,611-14 (1983).
22. See Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America,
June 8, 1972, art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 227, 229, 1049 U.N.T.S. 167, 169. "If the offence for which
extradition is requested is punishable by death under the relevant law of the requesting
Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for the death penalty
in a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances
satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out." Id.
23. Article 2(1) states: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law." Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
24. See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 158, 184 (1984).
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to the Commission's satisfaction that detention on "death row"
was inhuman and degrading treatment, leaving the question for
another day."
A. Soering and the "Death Row Phenomenon"
A few years later, the issue of whether extradition in cases
where the death penalty could be imposed violated Article 3 of the
Convention returned to the Commission in Soering v. United
Kingdom. Jens Soering was arrested in the United Kingdom
under an extradition warrant, issued at the request of the United
States. Soering, a German national, had lived in the United States
since the age of eleven. In 1985, eighteen-year-old Soering and his
girlfriend murdered her parents in Bedford, Virginia. After the
killing, Soering fled to the United Kingdom, where he was arrested
in 1986. In addition to the United States, the German government
also requested Soering's rendition, because Germany's laws permit
prosecution of nationals for certain crimes committed outside the
26territory. Germany had abolished the death penalty in 1949. In
Virginia, however, the death penalty was then-as it is now-very
much in force.
In a celebrated judgment, the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that Soering's extradition to the United States,
without an assurance that capital punishment would not be
imposed, constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights." An essentially unanimous Court
25. Id. at 190-91. After Kirkwood, another U.K. case came before the Commission,
involving extradition to Florida. N.E. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12553/86 (Eur.
Comm'n H.R., July 7, 1987, Hudoc reference REF0000291, struck off list) available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc/hedec/sift/291.txt (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). The
applicant stated that the issues under Florida's jurisdiction could be distinguished from
those in California, the state to which Kirkwood was extradited. Also, the applicant raised
the intriguing issue of the compatibility of the electric chair-the method of execution
used in Florida-with Article 3 of the European Convention. At the applicant's request,
the case was discontinued. Id. The records of the Commission reveal yet another U.K.
case involving extradition and capital punishment. Amekrane v. United Kingdom 1973
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 356 (1973) (Eur. Comm'n H.R., App. No. 5961/72). Amekrane
had fled to Gibraltar following an aborted coup d'itat in his native Morocco. He was
arrested by British authorities and returned to Morocco, where he was tried and executed.
In 1974, the United Kingdom and Amekrane's widow reached a friendly settlement
involving a payment of 35,000. Id.
26. See RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
GERMANY 1600-1987 861 (1996).
27. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 502-03
(1989). The Court. however, did not respond favorably to Amnesty International's amicus
2003]
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held that, even if the death penalty per se could not be deemed
contrary to the Convention, extradition would violate Article 3's
prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment because Soering
was threatened with the "death row phenomenon." Evidence had
been tendered to show that those sentenced to death in Virginia
typically spent six to eight years awaiting execution, under harsh
conditions. The Court pointed out that, although Virginia's post-
conviction procedures may be well intentioned and potentially
beneficial, "the consequence is that the condemned prisoner has to
endure for many years the conditions on death row and the
anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow
of death."2' The Court concluded:
[H]aving regard to the very long period of time spent on death
row in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and
mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty,
and to the personal circumstances of the applicant, especially
his age and mental state at the time of the offence, the
applicant's extradition to the United States would expose him
to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by
Article 3. A further consideration of relevance is that in the
particular instance the legitimate purpose of extradition could
be achieved by another means, which would not involve
suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration [i.e.,
extradition to Germany, where the death penalty would not be
imposed].29
The Soering decision was submitted to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, which oversees
implementation of Court rulings pursuant to Article 54 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The United Kingdom
reported to the Committee that, on July 28, 1989, it had informed
U.S. authorities that it would refuse extradition for an offense that
curiae, which invited the Court to consider Article 3 of the Convention as having implicitly
repealed the death penalty reference in Article 2(1). Only one judge on the Court agreed
with such a bold and innovative interpretation. Id. at 473-74, 504-05. Recently, a similar
view has been espoused by H6lio Bicudo of the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights. See Lamey et al. v. Jamaica, Case No. 11.826, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 89/98,
OEA/ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 146 (1998), available at http://www.umn.edu/
humanrts/cases/1998/jamaica89-98.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); see also Knights v.
Grenada, Case 12.028, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 47/01, OEA/ser.LV/II/111, doc. 20 rev. 841
(2000), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/S47-01.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2003).
28. Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 475-76,493.
29. Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 478.
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might impose the death penalty. Three days later, the United
States answered that, "in the light of the applicable provisions of
the 1972 extradition treaty, United States law would prohibit the
applicant's prosecution in Virginia for the offence of capital
murder."3"' The Committee then was satisfied that the United
Kingdom had respected the judgment and exercised its functions
under the Convention.3 Soering was subsequently extradited to
Virginia, where he pled guilty to two charges of murder, and for
which he was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison.
B. Soering's Impact upon Subsequent International Extradition
Cases
The European Court returned to Soering in March 2003,
when it considered an application from Kurdish leader Abdullah
Ocalan, who had been arrested in Kenya and then flown to Turkey
where he was subsequently sentenced to death for various terrorist
offences. The Court said "the legal position as regards the death
penalty has undergone a considerable evolution since the Soering
case was decided."32 In cautious language, the Court appeared to
endorse the position of Judge de Meyer, in Soering, to the effect
that the reference in article 2(1) of the Convention had been
implicitly repealed by the practice of the Member States of the
Council of Europe, including Turkey itself.33
The European Commission-prior to its abolition in 1998-
was called upon to interpret and apply the Soering decision on
several occasions. For example, in January 1994, it ruled
inadmissible an application from Joy Aylor-Davis, who was subject
to extradition to the United States for a capital offense. The
Commission considered sufficient the Dallas County prosecutor's
guarantees provided to the French government that if extradition
were granted, Texas would not pursue the death penalty. 34 Aylor-
Davis, however, claimed that the undertaking was "vague and
imprecise." Furthermore, she argued that federal authorities had
30. See Richard B. Lillich. The Soering case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 141. - perhaps it
will be a satisfactory reference for you.
31. See id.
32 Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 12, 2003), at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003), para. 195.
33 Id., paras. 189-198.
34. Texas law stated that the death penalty could only be pronounced if the
prosecution requested it.
2003]
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furnished, through diplomatic channels, the assurances that
prosecutors would not seek the death penalty and thus, such
assurances did not bind executive or judicial authorities in Texas.
The Commission compared Aylor-Davis' facts with those in
Soering, where the prosecutor had clearly intended to seek the
death penalty, and found the Texas prosecutor's attitude to be
fundamentally different.35 Thus, the Commission concurred with
an earlier decision of the French Conseil d'Etat, holding the
undertaking to be acceptable.36
The Commission made similar findings in several cases where
applicants claimed their expulsion or extradition could possibly
subject them to the death penalty. These cases all were dismissed
due to sufficient assurances that the death penalty would not be
imposed, the relatively minor nature of the offense in question,37 or
the unlikelihood of capital punishment actually being imposed in
the receiving state.38
Since Soering, Member States of the Council of Europe no
longer extradite to states where it is likely that capital punishment
will be imposed.39  Indeed, the Soering precedent almost
immediately took on a significance that did not strictly correspond
to the judgment's text. In practice, Council of Europe members
would use Soering to prohibit extradition to states on the basis that
the death penalty might be imposed, overlooking the "death row
phenomenon" issue, which was central to Soering's holding. This
popular or colloquial understanding of Soering is confirmed in the
explanatory documents accompanying the draft of Article 19 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted in December 2000 by
35. Aylor-Davis v. France, App. No. 22742/93, 76B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
164, 167, 171 (1994).
36. Les engagements d'un tat 6tranger en matiere d'extradition; Conclusions sur
Counseil d'tat, Assemblge, 15 octobre 1993, Mine Joy Davis-Aylor, 9(6) REVUE
FRANtAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 1166 (1993) (conclusions C. Vigoreux).
37. See, e.g., H. v. Sweden, App. No. 22408/93, 79A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
85, 91, 94, 96 (1994).
38. See Qinar v. Turkey, App. No. 17864/91, 79A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5,
8-9 (1994).
39. At the time of the Soering decision, the Council of Europe consisted of about
twenty members, mainly States of Western Europe, together with Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus. But since 1989, the Council's membership has expanded dramatically, and now
encompasses most of Europe, including Russia and several former Soviet republics, with
the notable exception of Belarus.
[Vol. 25:581
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Member States of the European Union. 4 0 These documents cite
Soering as authority for prohibiting extradition where there is
merely a threat of capital punishment, although this is not the
holding in Soering. Instead, Soering addressed conditions under
which the "death row phenomenon" violated the European
Convention prohibition against inhuman and degrading
treatment.4' Although the Charter is not a treaty and is without
binding effect, Member States would likely agree that it codifies
European human rights norms dealing with capital punishment.
The European Court's decision in Soering has since been
discussed and interpreted by both domestic and international
courts. Some courts have constructed the decision narrowly, by
pointing to various extenuating factors identified by the Soering
court (such as age and mental state) to assert that prolonged
detention on death row per se does not constitute inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Following this reasoning, a
majority of the U.N. Human Rights Committee has steadfastly
insisted that delay on death row must be accompanied by other
extenuating circumstances.4 ' The majority's position, however, is
met by a tide of dissent that ebbs and flows with the Committee's
changing composition.4 ' These dissenters have expressed the
concern that the "death row phenomenon" argument may actually
encourage states to execute offenders more rapidly, rather than be
accused of inflicting inhuman treatment through lengthy stays on
death row.
Several national courts have supported the minority
viewpoint of the Human Rights Committee. In a 1993 ruling
concerning death row prisoners in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe
40. The Charter of Fundamental Rights reflects the basic rights guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights. These rights are also derived from constitutional
traditions common to Member States and general principles of community law.
41. Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte 4473/00,
Convent 49, art. 19, (Oct. 11, 2000) available at http://db.consilium.eu.int/df/
default.asp?lang=en (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
42. See, e.g., Communication No. 558/1994: Jamaica 05/08/96 (Errol Johnson v. Jam.),
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Annex, at para. 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/
588/1,994 (1996).
43. Communication No. 271/1988: Jamaica 06/04/92 (Barrett & Sutcliffe v. Jam.),
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Appendix, at 254. U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988, (per Christine Chanet); see Markus G. Schmidt, The Death Row
Phenomenon: A Comparative Analysis, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH 47-72 (Theodore S. Orlin, et al., eds.,
2000).
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Supreme Court agreed with the position of the Committee's
dissenters and endorsed Soering. The Court found that the
minority's views were "more plausible and persuasive" than those
of the Committee's majority. 44  Later that year, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, citing Soering, held that
inordinate delay alone is sufficient to breach of the norm
prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment and that no
extenuatin circumstances, such as age or mental state, are
necessary.
In Kindler v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada's Justice
Gerald La Forest dismissed an argument against extradition based
on the length of detention on death row. Justice Forest, referring
to Soering, observed that "there may be situations where the age
or mental capacity of the fugitive may affect the matter, but ...
that is not this case. 46 In United States v. Burns, however, a case
the Canadian Supreme Court decided a decade after Kindler, the
Court noted that Kindler had not definitively settled the "death
row phenomenon" issue. In a unanimous decision, the Burns
Court moved away from the Kindler holding and recognized the
relevance of the psychological trauma associated with prolonged
detention while awaiting capital punishment.47
44. Catholic Comm'n v. Attorney-Gen., Zimb., reprinted in 14 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J.
323.
45. Pratt v. Attorney Gen. , Jam., reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 338, 346 (1993).
46. Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 838. For more information on Kindler,
see Sharon A. Williams, Extradition and the Death Penalty Exception in Canada: Resolving
the Ng and Kindler Cases, 13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 799 (1991); Sharon A.
Williams, Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 28 CAN. YB INT'L L. 117
(1990); Sharon A. Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death
Sentence as Bases for Refusing Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259 (1991); Sharon A.
Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking
the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191 (1992); Donald K. Piragoff & Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact
of Human Rights Principles on Extradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of
National Courts, 3 CRIM. L.F. 225 (1992); William A. Schabas, Extradition et la peine de
mort: le Canada renvoie deux fugitifs au couloir de la mort, 4 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 65 (1992); William A. Schabas, Kindler and Ng: Our Supreme
Magistrates take a Frightening Step into the Court of Public Opinion, 51 REVUE DU
BARREAU 673 (1991).
47. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 183, paras. 122-23 (Can.). For more
information on Burns, see William A. Schabas, United States v. Burns, 95 AM. J. INT'L L
666 (2001); Daniel Givelber, Innocence Abroad: The Extradition Cases and the Future of
Capital Litigation, 81 OR. L. REV. 161 (2002).
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IV. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
The European Court of Human Rights' Soering decision
prompted a string of cases before the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, in which litigants challenged extradition because they
could face the death penalty. The Committee, a so-called "expert
body" resembling a tribunal, considers applications that allege a
violation of the ICCPR involving states that have also ratified the
first Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
A. Canadian Cases before the U.N. Human Rights Committee
In 1991, the Committee considered two Canadian cases,
Kindler and Ng, in which the Supreme Court of Canada rejected
the European Court's reasoning and held that extradition did not
breach the Canadian constitution when there was a real threat of
capital punishment.48 In Kindler, the debate centered on Article 6
of the ICCPR, which explicitly allows capital punishment in states
where the death penalty has not been abolished, subject to a
number of constraints and restrictions. The Committee initially
held that Kindler's application was admissible because Kindler's
extradition to the United States might involve a breach of Article
6. On the merits of the case, however, the Committee found no
such violation.49 The Committee also addressed the death row
phenomenon featured in Soering, and held that mere delay in
imposing capital punishment could not be considered torture,
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 7
of the ICCPR. 0
Some months later, however, the Committee held, in Ng v.
Canada, that there had been a violation of the ICCPR because
Charles Ng was threatened with execution in the California gas
chamber. The Committee had previously deemed the gas chamber
contrary to Article 7.51 In yet another Canadian case, Cox v.
Canada, the Committee said that execution by lethal injection was
not contrary to the ICCPR's Article 7.52 A fourth Canadian case,
Judge v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, is currently
48. Kindler v. Canada, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307, 308 (1993); Ng v. Canada,
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 149 (1994).
49. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307,309 at paras. 6.5, 16.
50. Id. para. 15.2.
51. Ng, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 157.
52. Cox v. Canada, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410,417 (1994).
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pending before the Committee. Although Judge involves a
fugitive's deportation rather than extradition, the issues are
fundamentally the same. In 1998, the Quebec Superior Court
ordered that Judge be sent back to Pennsylvania, where he had
been sentenced to death before escaping and fleeing to Canada."3
The Committee is expected to issue its ruling on Judge during one
of its 2003 sessions.
B. Australian Cases before the U.N. Human Rights Committee
Recent Australian cases before the Human Rights Committee
have also involved extradition to countries where capital
punishment might be imposed. In A.R.J. v. Australia, the
Committee dismissed, as unsubstantiated, a petition from an
individual who claimed he might be sentenced to death on drug
54charges if deported to Iran. It reached a similar conclusion in a
case involving Malaysia, but this time some members of the
Committee expressed their dissent." Eckart Klein and David
Kretzmer believed that expulsion from Australia to Malaysia, a
country where a person is subject to the death penalty for
possession of a relatively small quantity of heroin, constituted a
breach of Article 6 of the ICCPR.5 6 Their reasoning is unclear,
which may imply that the violation of Article 6 consists of the
death penalty itself. However, this claim appears to conflict with
the text of Article 6(2)."7 Presumably, Klein and Kretzmer meant
that the offense charged would not meet the "most serious crimes"
requirement set out in the ICCPR. A third dissenter on the
Committee, Martin Scheinin, said the death penalty violated
Article 7 of the ICCPR because Article 7 prohibited torture, cruel,
53. Judge v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration et al., [1998] Q.J. No. 2322 (SC).
54. Communication No. 692/1996: Australia 11/08/97 (A.R.J. v. Australia), U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 60th Sess., Annex, at para. 6.12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/
692/1996 (1997).
55. Communication No. 706/1996: Australia 04/12/97 (T. v. Australia), U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 61st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61 /D/706/1996 (1997).
56. Id. (individual opinion by Committee members Eckart Klein and David Kretzmer
(dissenting)).
57. Article 6(2) states: "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the
law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6(2).
[Vol. 25:581
Indirect Abolition
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. s  Using
reasoning similar to the avant-garde argument rejected in
Soering,9 Scheinin suggested that Article 7 might neutralize the
acceptability of the death penalty found in Article 6.
In contrast with the situation in Europe, where the European
Court of Human Rights used the Soering decision to effectively
put an end to all extraditions when there was a realistic prospect of
capital punishment, the approach of the Human Rights Committee
is more inconsistent. The Committee has agreed that extradition
involving a punishment that infringes either Article 6 or 7 of the
ICCPR would itself be a violation. Yet, the Committee has found
that the death penalty did not infringe the ICCPR, with the
exception of the Ng case, which involved the gas chamber. During
presentation of periodic reports, however, the Committee
expressed appreciation that some states refuse to extradite without
assurances that the death penalty will not be implemented.
60
C. The U.N. Convention Against Torture
Although the ICCPR says nothing explicitly about whether
states may extradite, expel, or deport individuals who may face the
threat of capital punishment, the Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
provides that "no State Party shall expel, return ['refouler'] or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. ' ' 6 For the most part, the Committee Against
Torture has steered clear of death penalty issues. It has certainly
not shown itself to be a better forum than the Human Rights
Committee for death penalty litigation, although some of the
periodic reports to the Committee Against Torture refer to issues
62
concerning extradition to other states for capital crimes.
58. Id. (individual opinion by Committee member Martin Scheinin (dissenting)).
59. See supra text accompanying note 28.
60. Report of the Human Rights Committee (Vol. I), U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp.
No. 40, at 51, para 313, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997) (discussing Portugal/Macau).
61. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 9, 1975, art. 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114.
62. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, para. 29h, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/Add.7 (1997) (Third report of Panama); Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against
Torture, para. 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/9/Add.9 (1992) (Initial report of Italy); Consideration
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 25:581
V. NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND EXTRADITION
Although international human rights organs such as the
European Court of Human Rights have done much pioneering
work in the area of extradition and the death penalty, in recent
years the initiative has shifted to national constitutional courts.
The relevant tribunals of Italy, Canada, and South Africa have set
standards through important judgments that even the international
bodies have hesitated to impose.
A. Italy's Venezia Extradition Case
In June 1996, Italy's Constitutional Court denied extradition
of Pietro Venezia to the United States, despite assurances by U.S.
prosecutors that the death penalty would not be sought or
imposed. Article IX of the Treaty of Extradition of October 13,
1983, between Italy and the United States, entitles the sending
state to request that extradition be conditional upon an
undertaking that the death penalty not be imposed. The U.S.
government gave such assurances in the forn'i of a note verbale on
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR,
Comm. Against Torture, para. 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/17/Add.2 (1992) (Initial report of
Argentina); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, para. 41, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21/Add.2
(1994) (Initial report of the Czech Republic); Summary Record of the Public part of the
335th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 20th Sess., 335th mtg., paras. 5, 9,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.335/Add.1 (1998) (Initial report of Kuwait); Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR,
Comm. Against Torture, 17th Sess., 276th mtg., para. 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.276 (1996)
(Second periodic report of Poland); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, para. 11, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.2 (1997) (Initial report of the Namibia); Summary Record of the
Public Part of the 373rd Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 22d Sess., 373rd
mtg., para. 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.373 (1999) (Initial report of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia); Summary Record of the First Part of the 306th Meeting, U.N.
GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 19th Sess., 306th mtg., para. 14, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SR.306 (1998) (Second report of Portugal); Summary Record of the 123d Meeting,
U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 9th Sess., 123d mtg., para. 11, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SR.123 (1993) (Initial report of Norway); Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture,
para. 41, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21/Add. 2 (1994) (Initial report of the Czech Republic);
Summary Record of the First Part of the 140th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against
Torture, 10th Sess., 140th mtg., para. 36, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.140 (1993) (when Canada
was questioned about the extradition of Kindler and Ng, Canada hoped that the
Committee would appreciate the impropriety of further discussion since the matter was
pending before the Human Rights Committee).
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three separate occasions. The Constitutional Court, however, was
not satisfied.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court noted that the
prohibition against the death penalty took on special significance
in the constitution, as did all punishments that involved
humanitarian principles. The Italian Constitution enshrines the
right to life as the first of the inviolable human rights identified in
Article 2. The Court found that "[t]he absolute character of this
constitutional guarantee is of significance to the exercise of powers
attributed to all public authorities under the republican system,
and specifically with respect to international judicial co-operation
for the purposes of mutual judicial assistance. 6 3  The Court
reiterated that Italy's participation in punishments that cannot be
imposed within Italy in peacetime constitutes a breach of the
Constitution.
Referring to the mechanism by which the Italian authorities
consider the sufficiency of the U.S. authorities' assurances not to
impose capital punishment, the Court stated:
Such a solution has the advantage of providing a flexible
solution for the requested State, and allows for policy to be
developed over time based on considerations of criminal law
policy; but in our system, where the prohibition of the death
penalty is enshrined in the Constitution, the formula of
'sufficient assurances'-for the purpose of granting extradition
for crimes for which the death penalty is provided in the
legislation of the requesting State-is not admissible from the
standpoint of the Constitution. The prohibition set out in
paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Constitution and the values
that it expresses-foremost among them being life itself-impose
an absolute guarantee.64
As a result, the Italian Constitutional Court declared certain
provisions of the Code of penal procedure designed to give effect
to the extradition treaty between Italy and the United States to be
contrary to the Constitution. It also declared that the portion of
Law 225, which implemented Article IX of the extradition treaty,
was unconstitutional. It noted, however, that Italian law allowed
for Venezia to be prosecuted by Italian courts for crimes
63. Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Corte cost., 27 June 1996, n.223, 79
RIVISTA DI DIRITO INTERNAZIONALE 815 (1996).
64. Id.
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committed abroad.65 Venezia had also filed an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission,
however, decided to strike the case from its docket, due to the
Italian Constitutional Court's judgment.
66
B. The Changing Position in Canada
Even prior to Venezia, Italy manifested its opposition to
capital punishment by systematically refusing extradition without
assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. Canada,
on the other hand, had been extraditing individuals to the United
States without assurances against the use of capital punishment for
many years. The two constitutional challenges to this practice, by
Joseph Kindler and Charles Ng, were dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 1991.67 Canada was so sufficiently sensitive on
this point that, in 1999, it broke ranks with the majority of the
Commission on Human Rights. Traditionally one of the leading
elements on the Commission, Canada temporarily obstructed the
annual resolution on capital punishment because the European
States attempted to introduce a paragraph calling upon states to
explicitly reserve the right to refuse extradition in the absence of
effective assurances the death penalty would not be carried out.
68
Compromise language, affirming the principle of non-extradition
to states where capital punishment might be imposed, was
ultimately developed that managed to persuade Canada to support
the resolution.69
65. See id.; see also Andrea Bianchi, Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 731 (1997).
66. Venezia v. Italy, App. No. 29966/96, 87A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 140
(1996).
67. Kinder v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779; Ng v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858.
68. See Summary Record of the 58th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n,
55th Sess., 58th mtg. at para. 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.58 (1999); see also Daniel
LeBlanc, Canada Wants UN to Soften Extradition Proposal, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 19,
1999, at A3; Daniel LeBlanc, EU Won't Yield to Canadian Bid to Soften Extradition
Resolution, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 20 1999, at A2; llias Bantekas & Peter Hodgkinson,
Capital Punishment at the United Nations: Recent Developments, 11 CRIM. L. F. 23, 31
(2000).
69. See Report on the 55th Session, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 55th Sess.,
58th mtg., Supp. No. 3, at 204, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61, (1999). "Requests States
that have received a request for extradition on a capital charge to reserve explicitly the
right to refuse extradition in the absence of effective assurances from relevant authorities
of the requesting State that capital punishment will not be carried out." Id.
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The skirmish at the Commission on Human Rights took place
during litigation before the Canadian Supreme Court directed at
reversing the Kindler and Ng holdings. In United States v. Burns,
Glen Burns and Atif Rafay were subject to extradition to
Washington to stand trial for the murder of Rafay's parents. The
pair had confessed to the crime to an agent provocateur, but this
was later repudiated. The British Colombia Court of Appeal
refused Washington's extradition request on the grounds that
extraditing Burns and Rafay would violate their constitutional
right, as Canadian citizens, to return to their country. The 1991
Kindler and Ng decisions bound the Court of Appeal and limited it
from finding further grounds to refuse extradition. The Canadian
Supreme Court did not endorse the Court of Appeal's citizenship
argument, which it found to be far-fetched. Instead, the Supreme
Court effectively overturned the decade-old Kindler and Ng
precedents, and held that extradition to a state where the death
penalty might be imposed was unconstitutional, excluding
exceptional cases. It declined to speculate on what may constitute
an exceptional case, but asserted that such a situation certainly was
not present in Burns and Rafay's cases.70 The Burns Court stated:
The arguments against extradition without assurances have
grown stronger since this Court decided Kindler and Ng in
1991. Canada is now abolitionist for all crimes, even those in
the military field. The international trend against the death
penalty has become clearer. The death penalty controversies in
the requesting State-the United States-are based on
pragmatic, hard-headed concerns about wrongful convictions.71
The Burns Court was particularly impressed with arguments
and evidence concerning the danger of executing the innocent.
This issue was not addressed in Kindler and, to be fair, only within
the past decade has it emerged as a central theme in the death
penalty debate. Technological advances, principally the
emergence of DNA testing, have led to revelations about
miscarriages of justice. Within the United States, there is now
substantial literature on the subject.72  Additionally, several
70. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 284-86, 290, 295-97,303.
71. ld.. at 356.
72. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992); James S.,
Liebman, et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1839 (2000); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
erstwhile enthusiasts for capital punishment in the political sphere
have "blinked" on this issue. Perhaps the most celebrated
development in this area is the moratorium Governor Ryan of
Illinois ordered in late 1999, a move followed in January 2003 by
his systematic commutation of death row prisoners.
C. South Africa's Mohamed Extradition Case
Only a few months after the Burns ruling by the Canadian
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa tackled a
quite similar issue. In 1995, the South African Court issued a
landmark ruling, holding capital punishment to be inconsistent
with the post-apartheid interim constitution's protection of the
right to life and prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
73treatment or punishment. In June 2001, the Court granted a
petition by Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a participant in the Al
Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam. After
being arrested in South Africa, Mohamed was summarily turned
over to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations in what the
authorities called a deportation. The Court, however, saw no
reason to view the hand over as anything but a disguised
extradition. 4 According to the Court, by turning Mohamed over
to the United States without assurances that he would not face the
death penalty, "the immigration authorities failed to give any
value to Mohamed's right to life, his right to have his human
dignity respected and protected and his right not to be subjected to
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.""
At the time of the Constitutional Court's ruling against the
"extradition," Mohamed was already on trial in New York. He
was tried jointly with an accomplice, Mahmoud Mahmud Salim,
who had been extradited to the United States from Germany. The
United States had made a commitment to Germany that capital
punishment would not be imposed on Salim. The South African
Court, however, noted the unfairness of the situation, and refuted
suggestions that the United States might have provided the
assurance against imposing the death penalty against Mohamed,
73. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). The Court reaffirmed
the validity of Makwanyane in light of the new constitution, in Mohamed v. President of S.
Afr., 2001 (3) SALR 893, para. 39 (CC).
74. See, e.g., Mohamed, 2001 (3) SALR paras. 40, 60.
75. Id. para. 49.
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had it been sought.76 As a remedy for the constitutional violation,
the South African Constitutional Court ordered a copy of their
decision to be delivered immediately to the New York federal
district court trying Mohamed's case.77 The Court additionally
noted:
Not only is the learned judge presiding aware of these
proceedings, but the very reason why they were instituted by
the applicants was said to be that our findings may have a
bearing on the case over which he is presiding. On the papers
there is a conflict of opinion as between one of the defense
lawyers on the one hand and a member of the prosecution team
on the other, both of whom have filed affidavits expressing their
respective views as to the admissibility and/or cogency in the
criminal proceedings of any finding we might make. It is for the
presiding judge to determine such issues. For that purpose he
may or may not wish to have regard to disputed material such
as our findings. It is therefore incumbent on this Court to
ensure as best it can that the trial judge is enabled to exercise
his judicial powers in relation to the proceedings in this
Court....
Within days of the Constitutional Court's ruling, the New
York jury found Mohamed guilty of murder. Under federal law,
the jury again deliberated as to whether the convicted man should
be sentenced to death. Judge Sand, who presided over the trial,
took an extraordinary step and informed the jury of the South
African Constitutional Court's views. Additionally, the jury was
aware that Salim, who also had been found guilty, could not be
sentenced to death, as this had been a condition of his extradition
from Germany. On June 10, 2001, eleven of the twelve jurors
concluded that "others of equal or greater culpability in the
murders [would] not be sentenced to death," which was a
mitigating factor under the applicable federal statute. Mohamed
received a sentence of life imprisonment. 9
VI. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION
The number of countries that have abolished the death
penalty has grown more or less constantly since the end of the
76. Id. paras. 44, 55.
77. Id. para. 74.
78. Id. para. 71 (reference omitted).
79. United States v. Bin Laden. 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Second World War. Approximately two-thirds of the world's
states no longer impose the death penalty. Not only do these
states prohibit capital punishment on their own territories, but
they also indirectly extend this abolition by refusing to extradite
until the receiving state provides assurances that the death penalty
will not be imposed. Many extradition treaties enshrine a state's
right to deny extradition, subject to such assurances.
States sometimes argue before international human rights
bodies that, if such assurances become a sine qua non for
extradition, this may create situations of impunity, where an
offender cannot be brought to trial. However, other bars to
extradition have been common for many years, such as the
"political offense exception," and cases where the accused would
be denied a fair trial or subjected to torture. Recent Canadian and
South African constitutional court decisions have summarily
rejected, with good reason, the argument that requesting states
would not provide such assurances."s In Burns, the Canadian
government argued that the United States would not cooperate
with Canada's request for assurances that the death penalty would
not be imposed. Yet, immediately following the Supreme Court
decision, Canada's Justice Minister Anne McLellan said she
"expect[ed] no hitches in obtaining the assurances demanded by
the court" from the U.S. Department of State."' As expected, the
United States provided no resistance in offering assurances.
Similarly, recent constitutional court cases have also
discounted the in terrorem claim that abolitionist states risk being
inundated with fugitives from death penalty jurisdictions. In
Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court found this "safe haven"
argument to be unsubstantiated and unreasonable, stating:
[T]here is no evidence whatsoever that extradition to face life in
prison without release or parole provides a lesser deterrent to
those seeking a "safe haven" than the death penalty, or even
that fugitives approach their choice of refuge with such an
informed appreciation of tactics. If Canada suffers the prospect
of being a haven from time to time for fugitives from the United
80. See, e.g., id. at 364.
81. Kirk Makin, Supreme Court Decision: Top Court Speaks Out Against Extradition,
GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al.
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States, it likely has more to do with geographic proximity than
the Minister's policy on treaty assurances.
The refusal of abolitionist states to cooperate in imposing
capital punishment is increasingly manifesting itself in another
related manner, namely, in denying other forms of mutual legal
assistance. For example, after receiving assurances that the United
States would not use the information to seek or impose the death
penalty, French and German authorities agreed to provide
evidence to prosecute French national Zacarias Moussaoui for his
involvement in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States.83  German documents apparently provide information
about a transfer of money to Moussaoui from Ramzi Binalshibh, a
man alleged to have belonged to al Qaeda in Germany. French
documents depict the childhood and early adulthood of Moussaoui
in France, and apparently assist in establishing his connections
with Muslim radicals. The Germany Embassy in Washington
issued a statement on its website:
The German government will meet the request for legal
assistance by the U.S. government in the case of French citizen
Zaccharias Moussaoui. The United States of America has
assured, that the evidence and the information submitted by
Germany will not directly or indirectly be used against the
defendant nor against a third party towards the imposition of
the death penalty .... The German constitution (Art.2, par.1;
Art.102), which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty or
any submittance [sic] of material that might lead to the capital
punishment. The U.S. government has acknowledged this legal
position with the aforementioned assurance.84
In December 2002, the European Union reached a deal
allowing the United States to obtain personal data from Europol
law enforcement agency on suspects. Journalists described the
agreement as a "breakthrough" that resulted when the United
States accepted the European Union's condition that its members
82. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, para. 141 (Can.).
83. See Dan Eggen, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data From Europe, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2002, at A19; Christopher Marquis, Germany Agrees to Share Evidence Against 9/11
Defendant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A18.; Bruce Zagaris, Germans and French Agree
to Give Evidence in Moussaoui Case, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 21 (2003).
84. German Embassy in Washington, D.C., Germany gives legal assistance in the
Moussaoui case (undated), at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/
pol-terrortrial3.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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would not be expected to surrender suspects if they could face the
death penalty. 5
The United States finds itself increasingly cornered by its
stubborn insistence upon retaining the death penalty. In this
aspect, the country virtually stands alone among developed nations
and is ranked with Iraq, Iran, and China in what might be called an
international axis of state-sanctioned killing. Inevitably, most
extradition practice involves those states with which there is a land
border. As a general rule, neither Mexico nor Canada will
extradite to the United States in capital cases. Mexico even
refuses extradition in cases where life sentences with no possibility
of parole could be imposed. The vast majority of U.S. extradition
practices must now involve assurances that capital punishment will
not be imposed.
Those who are genuinely concerned about effective law
enforcement, even if they may favor capital punishment for serious
crimes, must understand that the death penalty is an
unnecessary-and costly-complication. This is true internally
because it burdens the justice system with onerous appeals and
post-conviction review. But, as this brief survey demonstrates, this
is also increasingly the case in extraditions and other forms of
mutual legal assistance. U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer's frank
recognition at the Rome Conference that an international criminal
jurisdiction is unworkable if it imposes capital punishment also
seems to be particularly valid for national justice systems in an era
of globalization. Abolition by jurisdictions within the United
States would certainly simplify prosecutions that involve
international cooperation and make justice in the country fairer,
more equitable, and, above all, more efficient.
85. See Ian Black, EU agrees to pass on intelleigence to FBI, GUARDIAN, Dec. 20,
2002, at 12; Press Release, USA and Europol sign a full co-operation agreement, Dec. 20,
2002, at http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=news&news=pr21220.htm (last visited
Sept. 21,2003).
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